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The Neutrality of Switzerland: Deception, Gold, and the Holocaust
Kyra McComas
From 1939 to 1945, Europe and Asia saw the deaths of 52 million people
and the mutilation and displacement of millions more as a result of the Second
World War. Amidst the carnage however, global commerce and the flow of capital
continued. Notably, a sum of at least 1.7 billion Swiss francs worth of gold was
deposited by Germany into the vaults of the Swiss National Bank in Bern.
Additional unknown amounts from private German deposits of looted gold were
laundered, making Switzerland one of the world’s wealthiest nations after the war.1
But how did Switzerland elude the scrutiny of the international community? This
essay seeks to illustrate how Switzerland’s image of neutrality has been
maintained, despite its complicity during the war, because of its history and
political and economic factors. I will further argue that Swiss complicity was a
decisive factor in the prolonged success of the Third Reich’s murder machine,
bestowing partial responsibility on Switzerland for the Holocaust and undermining
the myth of Swiss “neutrality.”
A History of Neutrality and Protection
The notion of Switzerland’s neutrality is grounded in its history as a
protecting power. Swiss neutrality was formally recognized in 1648 under the
Peace of Westphalia and renewed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Seven
centuries of cooperation between Romansh, French, Alemannic, and Italian
cultures, with four principal languages and three religions, makes Switzerland
unique in European history. Such coexistence has been far from multicultural
however, as there is little cross-cultural engagement, yet Switzerland’s national
identity is rooted in their alliance and neutrality. In other words, they avoid conflict
among themselves by eschewing global conflict. As such, at least prior to World
War II, Switzerland embraced a policy of neutrality that removed it from the
international arena. As André Gorz interpreted it, denial of existing conflicts
indicated no international actuality. Yet if the war did nothing else to Switzerland’s
global image, it certainly modified the understanding of neutrality, refocusing it on
1
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furthering peace and preventing evasion of responsibility via moral indifference.
The latter definition has been associated with pacifism (with a reservation on selfdefense) and mediation.2 Importantly, neither definition includes neutrality in the
banking or financial sector.
Switzerland exploited the former definition of neutrality to justify its lack of
confrontational involvement in World War II, by side-stepping the war and the
atrocities and unofficially providing aid for one side or the other. Ironically,
assistance is exactly what they provided by laundering German plunder. They
effectively used the narrative of neutrality to obscure their war-time actions.
Today, the second definition is used to support the claim that they simply,
mediated economic exchanges, which carried on despite the war and were crucial
to the rest of the world, especially the other non-belligerent countries.
As an international protecting power leading up to and during the war,
Switzerland had three primary roles: repatriating captives, transferring grants-inaid, and visiting prisoner camps (in league with the International Committee of the
Red Cross, headquartered in Geneva).3 Switzerland had demonstrated its
dedication to these functions and was thus heavily favored and trusted by the
international community, evidenced by its protective representation of at least
thirty-five nations on the eve of the war.4 Although commendable, this does not
excuse Swiss assistance to Hitler or the subsequent post-war suppression
complicity. The Red Cross never issued a public appeal for the Jewish Holocaust
victims,5 claiming that protestation would “produce a stiffening of the indicted
country’s attitude with regard to the Committee, even the rupture of relations with
it,” jeopardizing their humanitarian abilities and linking altruism to the neutral
Swiss image.6
2
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Faith in Swiss diplomacy to protect national interests extended to capital
interests as well. Long chosen as a repository for unstable countries’ finances,
Switzerland appeared as the best option for the safekeeping of Jewish funds and
valuables, especially with the rise of Nazism. The Swiss National Bank encouraged
such deposits by fortifying banking secrecy laws in 1934 to ensure client
anonymity.7 Who would have suspected that these same protective protocols would
be exploited to conceal nefarious transactions with the Third Reich?
Economic Crisis and the Failure of the Gold Standard
On a more objective level, the Swiss had a very real obligation to the global
economy. With the failure of the gold standard and the post-World War I economic
downturn, Switzerland’s significant role in the international market was not just a
matter of maintaining the Swiss national image, but was also crucial for the
recovery of the global economy and the continuance of foreign exchange. The
Swiss franc showed remarkable resilience in the aftermath of the war. It became
one of the first European currencies to attain its pre-war parity in 1924 and
prompted Switzerland to attempt to restore the gold standard. The Swiss franc was
the only currency accepted worldwide and was thus crucial to stable foreign
exchange, which continued despite wartime hardships. With the Swiss franc
relatively unscathed, the Swiss global economic presence was enhanced.8
Gold Laundering in the Context of War
Switzerland’s monetary history provided latitude for the Swiss National
Bank (SNB) to orchestrate its dealings with the Third Reich amidst the context of
wartime economics, politics, and militancy. One defense of the World War II gold
transactions between the SNB and the German Reichsbank is that the Swiss were
(1948), 21, quoted in Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
34.
7
Institute of the World Jewish Congress, “The Sinister Face of ‘Neutrality’: The Role of Swiss
Financial Institutions in the Plunder of European Jewry,” PBS Frontline, 1996,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nazis/readings/sinister.html (accessed 30 Oct.
2015).
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Vincent Crettol and Patrick Halbeisen, “Monetary Policy Background to the Gold Transactions
of the Swiss National Bank in the Second World War,” Swiss National Bank Report (1999).
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fearful of German invasion and attack. However, such an invasion would have
been unlikely, given Germany’s limitations on means of payment for their wartime
imports. The SNB was the only willing acceptor of gold in exchange for Swiss
francs, which importantly, were freely exchanged across the international market.9
Thus, the German economy relied on their exchange policy with the Swiss in order
to pay other countries for raw material imports that were crucial to the German war
effort. A memorandum from the German Reichsbank’s Ministerial Director
Clodius evidences the belief that the Swiss were their only hope. He wrote,
“Switzerland represents our only means of obtaining freely disposable foreign
exchange,” and confirmed this with the president of the Reichsbank, Reich
Minister Funk.10 This raises the question of Switzerland’s essential role in the
longevity of the Third Reich.
From 1939 to three weeks before Hitler’s suicide in April, 1945, the Swiss
gold-laundering machine exchanged gold from the German Reichsbank for 1.7
billion Swiss francs. The gold was deposited in bank vaults at Bern and was
laundered via purported “triangular transactions.” In this system, Germany
deposited looted gold in the SNB in exchange for Swiss francs, which they
subsequently used to purchase war materials from Turkey, Portugal, Sweden,
Spain, and other non-allied nations. These nations’ banks then used the Swiss
francs to pay for gold from Switzerland, the same gold for which the Swiss had
exchanged these very Swiss francs. Moreover, these nations could claim
legitimacy for their gold purchases, which were strictly through “neutral”
Switzerland, as part of the normal flow of foreign trade.11 Essentially, Switzerland
functioned as the middleman. But was such “mediation” de facto benign?
The SNB continues to project its image of the “neutral banker” today. It
denies the implications of “triangular transaction,” emphasizing its commitment to
the gold standard and its resulting guarantee to accept any gold it is offered. It also
claims that Germany certainly had its own gold reserves (that were not looted) as
well as legally acquired gold from Austria and Czechoslovakia, and this was the
gold involved in the transactions. Interestingly, the Swiss never mandated evidence
of the legality of the German gold, perhaps in an effort to maintain their neutrality
9
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by not being certain of the moral nature of the material they transacted.12 Their
function in the world market would be heavily undermined if it was discovered
they knew of the illicit nature of the gold, expunging their “neutral” front. But even
ignorance does not abrogate responsibility.
Chairman Ernst Weber, Alfred Hirs, and Paul Rossy constituted the
executive board of the SNB throughout the war. They continually referenced
“neutrality” to manipulate and aggrandize the term in their argument for
justification. They also called on the Swiss bank traditions of secrecy and clientele
loyalty, which were paramount to their exchanges with Germany, primarily
through Emil Puhl.13
The dismal state of the German economy was a major factor in how Puhl
would negotiate with the gold barons in Bern. In a letter to Hitler on January 7,
1939, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Board of the Reichsbank, elucidated
the poor state of German finances, stating, “No increase in the production of goods
can be achieved by increasing the amount of paper money.”14 The German
dependence on foreign wartime materials mandated the need for a banker, but
Schacht’s request for increased Reichsbank control did not please Hitler, who
turned to Puhl for management of German funds.15 Unlike Schacht, Puhl was not a
danger to Hitler’s authority, and was a friend and business partner of Weber, Hirs,
and Rossy. “He played like a virtuoso on the Swiss neutrality myth,” and astutely
assuaged their consciences with their own “neutrality” ploy to justify their
dealings. 16
Pervasive Anti-Semitism
The manipulation of historic labels was not the only justification
successfully employed by the Germans: anti-Semitism was a notable and
ubiquitous ideology. After the war, the American Jewish Committee asserted,
“Long before Hitler the environment of much of Eastern Europe was poisoned by
12

Ibid.
Ibid.
14
Hjalmar Schacht, “Confidential Reichsbank Matter” letter from the President of the Board of
the Reichsbank to the Führer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin (January 1939), in Ziegler, The Swiss,
the Gold, and the Dead, 38.
15
Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead, 39.
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anti-Semitism and was receptive to the anti-Jewish teachings of Hitlerism.”17
Switzerland was no exception. As a historic amalgam of communes and regions,
Switzerland was not a traditional nation-state. Xenophobia would become a
prominent feature of the Swiss Confederation. With such a prejudicial notion
already enmeshed in the nation, it is no surprise that anti-Semitism caught on so
easily. Due especially to the potency of Joseph Goebbels’s propaganda machine
and the inspirational rhetoric espoused by Hitler, anti-Semitism was readily
integrated into the zeitgeist of countless European countries. Anti-Semitism
became an official policy. A 1938 law mandating a “J” to be stamped onto the
passports of German Jews and the refusal to allow Jews to enter Switzerland as
refugees are two among many anti-Semitic actions undertaken by the Swiss
government.18
A 1998 study of Swiss World War II camps confirmed the prevalence of
Swiss anti-Semitism. In these camps, Jewish refugees were often forced to work
with little to no pay under harsh and cruel conditions and were subjected to a
“special Jew-tax,” which other non-Jewish refugees were not required to pay.
Families were frequently torn apart as children were separated from their parents
and “adopted” by Christian families who supposedly (and perhaps genuinely)
wanted to help. The British Foreign Office declassified records revealing that 80 to
98 percent of the camps’ inmates were Jewish, suggesting that they were intended
expressly for Jews.19
The potency of the anti-Semitism, which would infiltrate Swiss mentality
and be used to legitimize actions such as looting, is evidenced in the writings of
Austrian cabinetmaker Felix Landau. While on the Russian campaign, his faith in
Germany and his admiration of the Wermacht and Hitler were deepened. He
described how the “Ukrainians had done a pretty good job plundering. [But] they
had really thought they were the masters,” until they saw the power of the German

17

Joseph M. Proskauer, “The American Jewish Committee: Statement to The Anglo-American
Committee of Inquiry,” World Affairs 109, no. 1 (1946), 19.
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forces. 20 His arrogance and confidence in Germany reflects broader European antiSemitism which nurtured a sense of identity which pitted the supposedly good, the
non-Jewish supporters of Hitler’s leadership and Nazism against the repulsive Jew.
For Landau, sparing the Jews was unthinkable. Tellingly, he believed that the
major in charge of his battalion was an imbecile because “his actions [were] a
danger to the state. Take his remark that the Jews fall under the protection of the
German Wehrmacht. Who could have thought such a thing possible? That’s no
National Socialist.”21 Understanding the prevailing anti-Semitic culture and
indoctrination helps explain why the Swiss may have ignored the ethical
implications of laundering Nazi gold.
Consequently, rampant anti-Semitism legitimized the theft of Jewish
possessions such as art, gold, and capital. At a time when one could be “arrested
for having an anti-German attitude,” looting Jewish people and property became a
method of conveying German power and supremacy. 22 This translated at the
national level, wherein acceptance of Jewish loot was not only condoned, but was
encouraged, as in the case of the SNB. Greed, perhaps even more so than antiSemitism, drove people to willingly plunder. One German police official noted
“that people today give a false impression when they say that the actions against
the Jews were carried out unwillingly. There was great hatred against the Jews; it
was revenge, and they wanted money and gold.”23 And much of this loot was then
sent to Swiss banks for safekeeping.
International Response, or Lack Thereof
While Swiss covertness proved successful during the war, how were they
able to continue avoiding responsibility once the war ended and the international
community turned to judgment? The most obvious answer comes from the context
of war. The overwhelming economic, political, and cultural upheaval of World
War II and the extent of human loss was more than enough to overshadow the
20

Felix Landau, Once Again I’ve Got to Play General to the Jews (personal diary), quoted in The
Good Old Days, eds. Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, and Volker Riess (New York: The Free Press,
1991), 93.
21
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relatively petty monetary crimes of the Swiss (who were notably not directly
involved in the killings or atrocities of the Holocaust). Still, the Washington
negotiations that were held in 1946 to hold the Swiss accountable for looted and
laundered gold and dormant accounts were meant to serve due justice, but even
those fell short. As Ziegler notes, “The Swiss vanquished the victors of World War
II.”24
The main reason for the ineffectiveness of the 1946 Washington Agreement
was its lack of evidence and objectivity. The United States made the mistake of
leveling preposterous claims against Switzerland, blaming them for organizing
Operation Odessa and personal theft of central European banks. Plus, there was no
physical list detailing all the Nazi transactions with Swiss banks.25 Such overt
disregard for and exaggeration of actual transgressions facilitated Swiss evasion.
Swiss representative Walter Stucki capitalized on such absurdities and
deliberately manipulated the course of the accords, creating compromises that
favored the Swiss. In addition to the emotional nature of the negotiations was the
stress of the looming Cold War and the perceived threat of communism to the
Western world. This became a far higher priority for American foreign affairs than
obtaining justice for the victims of the war. In the end, Switzerland agreed to pay
250 million Swiss francs as the final settlement of all claims relating to the
laundering of Nazi gold. Stucki exploited the language of altruism by shrewdly
labeling this as “Switzerland’s voluntary contribution to the reconstruction of
Europe,” injecting the reparations with neutral undertones and reifying a positive
Swiss global image. 26 Stucki’s success in defying the victorious Allies at the
Washington Agreement and avoiding responsibility for war-time atrocities lasted
for nearly fifty years. It was not until the World Jewish Congress finally forced the
reopening of dormant Jewish accounts, which they later documented at
$1,297,240,126 attributed to 457,100 Jewish descendent claimants.27
The pardoning of Swiss gold laundering was also predicated on the fact that
there were dormant accounts in other European countries, the United States, and
Israel. If the international community condemned the Swiss for hiding and
24

Ziegler, 193.
Ibid.
26
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25
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benefiting from dormant accounts, they would subsequently have to recognize their
own financial profiteering. In other words, plenty of other nations were guilty of
similar dealings. Hence, the origins of personally beneficial funds (that functioned
to augment global image and presence) became a null point of condemnation for
the Swiss. Other nations, especially the United States, which dominated the
Washington Agreement, had their own greedy motivations.28 In fact, between 1939
and 1945, the Allies exchanged substantially more gold with the SNB than did the
Reichsbank. The United States sold 2.242 million francs worth of gold, and France
and Great Britain sold even more at 189 million francs and 673 million francs,
respectively. This was largely as a result of the growing importance of the Swiss
franc in international trade, attesting to the fact that gold had become the most
important form of payment by 1941. Moreover, just as they employed a neutrality
argument for their dealings with Germany, the Swiss did the same in accepting
blocked gold in the United States since Swiss francs had become so vital.29
With money as a major motivator, the Allies wanted to benefit from their
holdings as much as the Swiss, so they had to be cautious of how they accused the
Swiss. Thus, the focus of the debates at the Washington Agreement was on “the
symbolic issues... such as whether governments and companies are willing to
acknowledge their responsibility as beneficiaries from or collaborators with the
Nazi regime.”30 But because of the successful secrecy of SNB actions and its
policy of confidentiality, most evidence for supporting an ethical case against
direct Swiss dealings with the Nazis (thereby implicating themselves as
accomplices in genocide) was highly censored and effectively hidden.
Swiss Fear of a Faltering National Image
While Switzerland may have evaded just international scrutiny, they faced a
looming identity crisis. The historical narrative of neutrality had long been
essential to Swiss self-perception; to avoid a plight around national identity, the
Swiss could not afford to allow such a narrative to be unraveled and doubted. The
28

Regula Ludi, “Waging War on Wartime Memory: Recent Swiss Debates on the Legacies of
the Holocaust and the Nazi Era,” Jewish Social Studies 10, no. 2 (2004), 116-152.
29
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Washington Agreement enabled Switzerland to transform itself from a Nazi
accomplice into an esteemed member of Western democracy, largely for economic
reasons. Once again, global politics played a key role, since Zurich, Basel, and
Geneva were pivotal financial centers in the fight against communism. This
heavily benefited the West: the United States knew it was to their advantage to
appease the Swiss in the interest of the future global economy and trade. Thus,
they arguably allowed themselves to be beguiled by Stucki and the other cunning
Swiss representatives.31 This reassurance and reinstatement as a respected member
of the free world may have prevented the complete shattering of Swiss national
identity.
Interestingly, the Swiss have been paradoxically bound together by modern
controversies regarding their wartime position, with national pride in armed
neutrality dominating any moral disgust in their economic service to the Third
Reich. Both sides accounted for the German sparing of Switzerland from invasion
to independent Swiss activity for its own survival, essentially reinforcing the
historical image of self-preservation as a defensive confederation. 32 The Swiss
laundering case reveals how fear drives history, as the Swiss were motivated by a
genuine fear of losing economic prestige as well as the moral high ground they
held as a soft power. Such fears contributed to the national identity struggle, which
inevitably failed to fully manifest thanks to a potent, albeit falsified, narrative of
national, yet purportedly neutral, heroics.
The Problematic Confines of Bifurcated Guilt and Complicity
The issue with Switzerland’s “neutrality” emerges in political labeling: they
are officially equivocal regarding the war. Ludi contends that “the government
endorses the reinterpretation of Swiss history of the Nazi era... [and
simultaneously] rejects the legal responsibility this shift would entail.”33 In an
effort to support the reevaluation of their history with Nazi Germany, the Swiss
parliament established the Independent Commission of Experts (ICE) in 1996 to
officially investigate the dormant accounts. Importantly, however, the 2002 final
31
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33
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report did not receive much media response, indicating the waning interest in
wartime history.34 This reveals the deeper challenge of objective analyses of
genocide as it gets farther away in memory, which is exacerbated by the tendency
of post-genocidal silencing. It also suggests the decrease of Swiss global presence,
since Switzerland seems less financially powerful with growing unemployment
and bankruptcy claims by major Swiss companies; they have shown vulnerability
to international market fluctuations, becoming financially more like other
European nations.
In turn, this gives Switzerland some flexibility to redefine their international
image despite their past transgressions. Claims lose potency as events fade into
history and historians must be cognizant of this when evaluating key historical
events, especially complex ones such as the Holocaust. Relying on a binary
narrative of “guilt” only hampers attempts to sift through historical complexities. It
is crucial to note the genuine Swiss honesty and altruism that has existed in
dialogue with the deviance. As a Swiss native, Ziegler suggests that the vast
majority of Swiss people “harbor but one ambition, that of fulfilling in the world
an active role characterized by humanity and solidarity with other nations.”35
Internal anger also evidences the diversity of Swiss intentions, far from being one
homogenized, greedy ideology. Cash, a leading Swiss financial organ, blatantly
denounced the greed and lies of the SNB, printing one headline stating, “But for
Switzerland’s gold turntable, the war in Europe would have ended much sooner.”36
An important note here is that such decrial waited until 1996 to be heard,
reinforcing the successful evasion from condemnation immediately following the
war.
Aside from problematizing binary guilt labeling, this internal anger
simultaneously raises concerns about the role of complicity. While such local
Swiss differences do not condone the actions of the SNB as a Nazi accomplice,
they blame the endurance of the Third Reich solely on Swiss aid. Fifty years after
the Holocaust, the international community rallied behind these accusations,
legitimized internally by the Swiss. But did this not also transform Switzerland into
a scapegoat to assuage the broader international community’s guilt about the
34
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Holocaust? The United States certainly capitalized on this opportunity to distract
from its own responsibilities; it was an opportunity to call for Swiss justice without
bringing attention to American financial offenses during the war. Thus, the notion
of collective guilt becomes relevant in light of dormant Jewish accounts both in the
United States and Switzerland (among other countries). But there is still the
problem of how complicity actually implicates nations in assuming responsibility
for the Holocaust. While the Swiss may have prolonged the Holocaust and the
survival of the Third Reich, challenging the narrative of neutrality, the lack of
direct killing separates them from the Nazis on the spectrum of guilt. At the same
time, acknowledging the spectral nature of guilt does not pardon any nation from
their responsibility to humanity. The atrocities of genocide demand robust
international response such that complicity or claims of “neutrality” cannot
abrogate responsibility. This is a matter not of economics or politics, but one of
morality, whereby our humanity implicates us should we ignore injustices against
our fellow human beings.
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